Sudan/ Beyond mediation: Saudi Arabia’s intelligence campaign against the Rapid Support Forces

Exclusive,

Private sources have revealed intense intelligence and logistical activities taking place over the past few days in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. These activities brought together Sudanese security and diplomatic officials arriving from Türkiye  with Saudi officials and representatives of Turkish companies to discuss complex security and investment arrangements linked to the course of the conflict in Sudan.

High-level security and economic delegation in Riyadh

The Sudanese delegation traveling from  Türkiye  included security and technical figures.

It was led by Muhannad Omar Abbas Ajbana and accompanied by Jilani Mohammed Jilani (representing the Sea Ports Corporation), Saif al-Nasr al-Tijani (representing the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport), Lieutenant General Rabie Suleiman, and Hamida al-Haj (the ports’ financial officer), as well as intelligence officers from the Sudanese Embassy in Ankara and Zaid bin Mukhallad al-Harbi.

Consultations focused on a secret deal involving the Turkish company “Argaz” (Gas and Investments) and the Sudan Ports Corporation, in coordination with the Sudanese Defense Industries System and financing entities.

The understandings include facilitating the transport of military hardware, drones, raw materials, and explosives as well as shipments of chlorine gas via Jeddah ports to Port Sudan under the guise of civilian use and water purification, alongside direct air cargo flights between Turkey and Port Sudan.

The terms of the deal include financial arrangements utilizing multiple banking channels that route through India to conceal the financing pathways.

A follow-up meeting is scheduled to be held in Ankara on September 14, 2026, bringing together representatives from the defense industry, officials from the Saudi military attaché’s office in Türkiye , and Turkish officials.

This follows a visit by the head of the Turkish company (Mehmet Tabbakh) to the ports headquarters and his meeting with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Energy, Ali Abdul Rahman.

Field and Intelligence Track

These moves coincided with extensive meetings held in Riyadh between Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman and Sudanese leaders.

These meetings were attended by police representatives including Al-Tahir Ali Mohammed Al-Baloula and Abdul Moneim Mohammed Abdul Qayyum alongside members of the delegation arriving from Ankara.

Discussions focused on a strategy aimed at weakening the “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF) and extracting their field commanders through organized mechanisms of co-optation and the purchasing of loyalties. The action plan comprises several key pillars:

• Infiltration and Field Co-optation: Sudanese security commanders have been tasked with gathering detailed data on leaders within the “Ta’sis” (Founding) alliance and the RSF. They are to enlist figures such as Al-Nour Al-Qubba, Al-Safna, and Faris Al-Nour to persuade political and military leaders to defect and join the Sudanese Army in exchange for financial incentives.
• Logistical Route via the Central African Republic: Secret communication lines will be established in the “Um Dafuq” border area in coordination with elements of the “Séléka” forces opposed to the Bangui government to facilitate the exit of defectors from Darfur.

This operation will leverage the expertise of former diplomat Jamal Al-Shahid (currently in Cairo) in securing exit corridors.

Personnel will then be transported using temporary travel documents to the Congo serving as a transit country en route to , while bypassing the Chadian route.

These facts clearly reveal the true nature of Riyadh’s role one that has transcended claims of mediation and neutrality to become direct intelligence and logistical involvement in fueling the Sudanese conflict.

The utilization of ports, the transfer of military hardware, and the flow of funds to purchase loyalties and dismantle the situation on the ground demonstrate that Saudi calculations disregard the tragedy of the Sudanese people; instead, they seek solely to re-engineer the political and military landscape to serve agendas of regional influence, even at the cost of prolonging the war and plunging the country into further chaos and destruction.